For an autonomous system to be helpful to humans and to pose no unwarranted risks, it needs to align its values with those of the humans in its environment in such a way that its actions contribute to the maximization of value for the humans. We propose a formal definition of the value alignment problem as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL). A CIRL problem is a cooperative, partial- information game with two agents, human and robot; both are rewarded according to the human's reward function, but the robot does not initially know what this is. In contrast to classical IRL, where the human is assumed to act optimally in isolation, optimal CIRL solutions produce behaviors such as active teaching, active learning, and communicative actions that are more effective in achieving value alignment. We show that computing optimal joint policies in CIRL games can be reduced to solving a POMDP, prove that optimality in isolation is suboptimal in CIRL, and derive an approximate CIRL algorithm.

They present a novel model that seems like it could potentially have practical impact. There is theoretical and experimental evaluation. The theoretical results did not seem particularly deep, and I think the main value of the contribution rests on how realistic/important the new conceptual model is for modeling realistic scenarios. I would start with a motivating example much earlier, provide more intuition for why it is important, and describe important real-world scenarios that it exemplifies. The first example is not until page 6 line 238.

AI Safety is an emerging area of critical importance to the safe adoption and deployment of AI systems. With the rapid proliferation of AI and especially with the recent advancement of Generative AI (or GAI), the technology ecosystem behind the design, development, adoption, and deployment of AI systems has drastically changed, broadening the scope of AI Safety to address impacts on public safety and national security. In this paper, we propose a novel architectural framework for understanding and analyzing AI Safety; defining its characteristics from three perspectives: Trustworthy AI, Responsible AI, and Safe AI. We provide an extensive review of current research and advancements in AI safety from these perspectives, highlighting their key challenges and mitigation approaches. Through examples from state-of-the-art technologies, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), we present innovative mechanism, methodologies, and techniques for designing and testing AI safety. Our goal is to promote advancement in AI safety research, and ultimately enhance people's trust in digital transformation.

For an autonomous system to be helpful to humans and to pose no unwarranted risks, it needs to align its values with those of the humans in its environment in such a way that its actions contribute to the maximization of value for the humans. We propose a formal definition of the value alignment problem as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL). A CIRL problem is a cooperative, partial- information game with two agents, human and robot; both are rewarded according to the human's reward function, but the robot does not initially know what this is. In contrast to classical IRL, where the human is assumed to act optimally in isolation, optimal CIRL solutions produce behaviors such as active teaching, active learning, and communicative actions that are more effective in achieving value alignment. We show that computing optimal joint policies in CIRL games can be reduced to solving a POMDP, prove that optimality in isolation is suboptimal in CIRL, and derive an approximate CIRL algorithm.

Our goal is for AI systems to correctly identify and act according to their human user's objectives. Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL) formalizes this value alignment problem as a two-player game between a human and robot, in which only the human knows the parameters of the reward function: the robot needs to learn them as the interaction unfolds. Previous work showed that CIRL can be solved as a POMDP, but with an action space size exponential in the size of the reward parameter space. In this work, we exploit a specific property of CIRL---the human is a full information agent---to derive an optimality-preserving modification to the standard Bellman update; this reduces the complexity of the problem by an exponential factor and allows us to relax CIRL's assumption of human rationality. We apply this update to a variety of POMDP solvers and find that it enables us to scale CIRL to non-trivial problems, with larger reward parameter spaces, and larger action spaces for both robot and human. In solutions to these larger problems, the human exhibits pedagogic (teaching) behavior, while the robot interprets it as such and attains higher value for the human.